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EXPECTATIONS AND PRACTICAL RESULTS IN
FINGERPRINTING TECHNOLOGY: WHERE IS THE
LINE DRAWN?
Rebecca Parrott Waldren*
1. INTRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTIONIZES THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Continued technological advances create and shape a world that was unimaginable
to our ancestors. To the twenty-first century inhabitant, life centers around technology
as it affects and encompasses every aspect of normal days. One area that has greatly
evolved and changed with technological developments is the criminal justice system.
Since "forensic science ... has been an invaluable tool for the criminal justice system
for over a century,"'I the technological advances in this field necessarily evoke changes
within the courtroom. Today, lawyers utilize both science and technology to offer and
present evidence which mere decades ago could neither be collected nor extracted.
Through mass media coverage of new technology, jurors hold high expectations that the
prosecution will employ the latest technology to extract evidence as proof of guilt for
the accused.2 Currently, judges must evaluate these new technological developments in
order to determine its admissibility in their courtrooms. Therefore, it is ultimately the
judge's decision on the admissibility of evidence obtained through these new
technological measures that will most affect all of the courtroom players.
There is some guidance offered on the admissibility of such evidence through
congressional and state legislation. However, much of this legislation and regulation is
insufficient. It seems that even the legislatures, both federal and state, take advances in
technology for granted. This is a failing on their parts because they are forgetting that
the effects of this technology must be laid out in legislation. Legislation is necessary in
order to guide courtrooms on how to proceed when lawyers attempt to offer evidence
that is based in large part on advances in science technology.
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1. Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Individualization Sciences and the Capital Jury: Are Witherspoon Jurors
More Deferential to Suspect Science Than Non-Witherspoon Jurors? 27 S. ILL. U. L. J. 477, 482 (2003).
2. See id. at 482 ("[T]here is an expectation from jurors that such evidence will be presented at trial.").
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Throughout this Note, it will examine a piece of federal legislation, 3 which deals
not only with new technology, but more specifically with new fingerprinting
technology. Thus, the new advances in fingerprinting technology will take up the major
focus of this Note. A discussion of such legislation and its immediate ramifications
takes place in Part II. In Part III, this Note discusses the new criminal identification
technology in general and its significance on the current court system.
Yet, there is a downside to these new technologically advanced fingerprinting
programs. Issues arise when new advances in technology are used to take partial
fingerprints in order to generate a full print.4 Defense attorneys argue that individuals
are being convicted on information that is partially produced by a machine. Thus, they
see this information as fabricated evidence. 5 This leads to the conclusion that using
technology in this way is unconstitutional and inaccurate. 6 Therefore, a discussion of
the negative ramifications and possible challenges to new fingerprinting legislation and
the technology behind it is put forth in Part IV.
Finally, the way this new technology is portrayed in the media, and its effect on the
public perception, which has ramifications for the justice system, is discussed in Part V.
For example, since this technology is operated by computers, it allows experts to
introduce fingerprinting evidence in a 3D color view, rather than the traditional flat
black and white perspective. Many jurors now expect to see these advancements in
technology utilized both in the criminal investigation and in the courtroom. But what if
their expectations are too high?7 Perhaps because of popular television shows such as
CS 8 and the ever expanding Law and Order franchise, 9 jurors expect the partial print
computer-generated analysis of which the statute may not even allow. What happens
when the prosecution is barred from giving the jury what they expect? Is a result of this
simply that criminals go free? These questions should be thoroughly investigated when
evaluating statutes which call for advancements in technology in the criminal field.
In conclusion, this Note argues that instead of barring this technology from the
courtroom, legislators must take the important step of setting standards to ensure that all
fingerprints admitted into evidence are verifiably unaltered. Only then can we ensure
that justice will prevail, and this proposed law will work to reign in jurors' exorbitant
expectations of technology in the courtroom.
3. See Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).
4. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried & Michael Cherry, The Myth of Fingerprints, 27 CHAMPION
36, 36 (2003) [hereinafter Myth].
5. See, e.g., Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is
Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 649 (2002) ("[A] number of defense attorneys have already filed motions
contesting the admissibility of latent fingerprint identification evidence."). See also Myth, supra note 4, at 36
("[l]n some cases, the image compared to the inked impression is one which the police have in a very real
sense created.").
6. Epstein, supra note 5, at 617 (describing how once courts accepted fingerprinting identification as
evidence, they did not revisit the matter.) "In not one of these opinions, however, did a court consider the
essential question of the reliability of latent fingerprint identifications." Id.
7. See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, Reality Programming Lessons for Twenty-First Century Trial Lawyering,
31 STETSON L. REV. 61, 75 (2001) ("Generation Xers have experienced all of life and learning visually; thus,
words without images are unlikely to interest or persuade them.").
8. See infra note 135.
9. See infra note 138.
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II. LEGISLATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A PUSH FOR NEW FINGERPRINTING
TECHNOLOGY
The criminal justice system must adapt to changing technology and greater
expectations of jurors. Legislation has been slow to address these needs.' 0 However, in
recent years, Congress made some effort to fill in these gaps and set an example for
states to follow. Congress has tried to allow for advances in technology that would
bring in a whole new type of physical evidence to the courtroom. Recognizing the role
physical evidence plays in a conviction, II Congress attempted to boost the resources of
agencies in charge of gathering this evidence. As a result, and in an effort to keep in
pace with advancing technology, the federal government instituted a state grant program
under the Crime Identification Technology Act. 12  The purpose of this act is "to
establish or upgrade an integrated approach to develop information and identification
technologies and systems."' 13  The federal government offered to pay up to ninety
percent of the costs of these systems to applying states. 14  These improved systems
include:
" automated fingerprinting identification systems that are compatible with standards15
established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and interoperable
with the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation';
16
* finger imaging, live scan, and other automated systems to digitize fingerprints and to
communicate prints in a manner that is compatible with standards established by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and interoperable with systems
• . 17
operated by States and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
10. But see John P. Tribuiano III, Review of Selected 2002 California Legislation: Crimes: The
Continued Expansion of the DNA Database: California's Response to September lth, 34 McGEORGE L.
REv. 405, 405 (2003) (describing how California took quick action after September 11, 2001 "by enacting
Chapter 160, which requires individuals convicted of felonious terrorist offenses to provide deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) for inclusion in the state database"). This article also notes that "all fifty states have passed DNA
database statutes for the purpose of solving various classes of unsolved crimes." Id.
11. See Cooley, supra note 1, at 483 ("Physical evidence is essential because research indicates that
jurors' decisions are 'significantly influenced' by '[p]hysical evidence which often ties the defendant to the
scene of the crime."') (citing Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, I 1
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1987)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. The National Institute of Standards and Technology's ("NIST") "mission is to develop and promote
measurement, standards, and technology to enhance productivity, facilitate trade, and improve the quality of
life." See NIST General Information, available at http://www.nist.gov/public..affairs/general2.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
16. The FBI instituted the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("IAFIS") in 1999.
See Florence Olsen, Working Day and Night, FBI Finishes IAFIS Code, GCN NEWS (1999), available at
http://www.gcn.com/18_12/news/34646-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (b)(2), (b)(3) (2000).
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These grants allow, and indeed are a push, for states to update their systems. The
bill provides funding for new technological systems, which is an important step in the
attempt to bring the investigative tools of police and prosecutors up-to-date. This
legislation also signifies a recognition by Congress that it is time for the criminal justice
system to come into the twenty-first century.
As these new systems came into practice, they revolutionized fingerprinting as used
both in the investigation of crimes and as evidentiary material in a courtroom.
Technology, in general, makes it possible to yield clearer and more accurate fingerprint
matches. One important technological advancement is the ability of computers to
remove background patterns and "lift" a fingerprint, which produces a full print capable
of being matched to a criminal suspect. 18 Because of technological advancements, what
was once a useless print has now become a key piece of evidence in solving a criminal
case.
Questions do arise as a result of this legislation. For example, how much new
technology does this federal statute expect when it seeks to use systems to communicate
prints in a manner that is compatible with the standards "established by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology?"' 19 According to a summary of the standards
put forth by the NIST, the applicable standards listed are numerous and in-depth, which
ensures accuracy in these new fingerprinting systems. However, these standards only
address the actual fingerprint scanning machines 2 1 for accuracy and testing, and fail to
address other major concerns that must be considered in using this new fingerprinting
technology. For example, the standards to which the systems must comport do not
stipulate what information can be used as evidence in a courtroom. The entire system is
designed to extrapolate evidence to be presented in a criminal case, but this legislation
makes no mention or reference as to how the evidence will reach its endpoint and what
standards it should be held to in the final stage-the courtroom. These issues are cause
for concern and will be discussed in depth in Part III. Now, it may be more relevant to
view the actual science behind this fingerprint technology and its overall value.
III. CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
2 2
"The science of fingerprints was the first forensic science that caught the public's
imagination and also provided a valuable tool for police and criminal investigators."
23
Over a hundred years have passed since this art was accepted in the different criminal
fields. 24 Naturally, with the dawning of the present age of computers, it was only a
18. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 14601(b)(3).
20. See Summary of NIST Standards For Biometric Accuracy, Tamper Resistance, and Interoperability,
available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/NISTAPP Nov02.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
21. These machines are part of the Live Scan system. For a discussion of this technology, see infra text
accompanying note 25.
22. This is the title given to the subchapter which discusses fingerprinting technology in 42 U.S.C. §
14601 (2000).
23. Simon A. Cole, Book Review, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal
Identification, 50 FED. LAW 46,47 (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Suspect Identities].
24. See Michael Mears & Therese M. Day, The Challenge of Fingerprint Comparison Opinions in the
Defense of a Criminally Charged Client, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 705, 711 (2003) ("The human physiological
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matter of time before digitalized fingerprinting was created, giving the art of
fingerprinting a much needed face lift. The problems with ink fingerprinting (the
traditional method of printing), such as "smudging, smearing, and over or under
inking," 25 coupled with the time-consuming process of comparing prints were enough
for a computerized alternative to be sought. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") led the pack in the search and implementation of a new system. The first step
in the process required a government agency, in this case the FBI, to copy all "hard"
copies (paper copies) kept in the federal registrar into digital format. 26 In total, over
forty million fingerprint records were transcribed into the FBI's IAFIS system.27 Once
all the fingerprints were digitalized, it became necessary to create a system capable of
transmitting a new fingerprint onto a computer instead of with ink. The program also
had to be able to compare the print to those in the database in order to find a match.
28
Live Scan produced the answer to the search.29 One article succinctly described how
the process works:
Finger imaging is the process of using computer equipment to scan fingerprint
impressions and to extract identifiable characteristics .... The computer's scanning
and mapping algorithms convert the spatial relationship of a fingerprint's minutiae
points as well [as] the ridge direction and ridge contour information into a digitized
representation of the fingerprint. Before conducting a search, the technician may
enhance the prints to include cuts or breaks in the ridges caused by scars or bums.
The computer does not actually compare one fingerprint against another, but rather
conducts a mathematical search. The computer's search algorithm converts the data
extracted by the scanner into a binary code which is then used to search the
computer's files. The computer, using a component called a matcher, can search a
candidate print against the file prints at a rate of 500 to 600 prints per second.
30
Once the IAFIS system was in place and proved successful, Congress took notice.
Shortly after the implementation of the FBI database, Congress passed the Criminal
Identification Technology Act 31 to encourage states to adopt this or similar systems.
feature commonly called fingerprints had been recognized for centuries in China and India before Europeans
'invented' it in the late nineteenth century and disseminated the Anglo-American system of fingerprint
identification.") (citing Simon Cole, What Counts for Identity? The Historical Origins of the Methodology of
Latent Fingerprint Identification, 12 Sci. IN CONTEXT 139, 147 (1999)). In fact, this evidence has been so
well received that "proponents of other forms of scientific evidence have routinely named their respective
technologies to evoke the certainty and reliability of fingerprints, leading to such nomenclature as DNA
fingerprinting, ballistic fingerprinting, and even nuclear fingerprinting." Nathan Benedict, Note, Fingerprints
and the Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed
Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 520 (2004) (citations omitted).
25. See Live Scan, available at http://www.livescanfingerprinting.com/quest.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2005).
26. See Olsen, supra note 16.
27. Status of INDENT/IAFIS Integration, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/inspection/plus/0203/
back.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
28. See Suspect Identities supra note 23, at 47 ("It does no good to have matching fingerprints unless one
can recognize that they match. A method is needed to describe the whorls and ridges.").
29. See generally Live Scan, supra note 25.
30. Jennifer K. Constance, Comment, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: Issues and Options
Surrounding Their Use to Prevent Welfare Fraud, 59 ALB. L. REV. 399, 401 (1995).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).
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After the federal government passed this legislative incentive, which would help defer
the costs of implementing comparative state systems, 32 several states took advantage of
the offer.
33
Those states that implemented the systems received tremendous benefits as a result.
In New York, it was reported:
[d]uring Fiscal Year 2002, the period of time when a person was arrested to when
their [sic] criminal record was received from [the] [Division of Criminal Justice
Services) was an average of 4.68 hours. Prior to the implementation of Live Scan, it
took an average of 13.61 hours to receive a criminal record.
34
Additionally, "[w]ith Live Scan, the fingerprint rejection rate has gone from
approximately 30% to 3.1%. ' '35 One Washington state police lieutenant described the
practical effects of the rapid exchange of information: "Live Scan will cut down on the
time it takes to identify people who lie about their identities when they are booked into
jail. ' 36 He also noted that, "[i]f you have someone who is drunk or combative, they can
smear all over the place and you can't use them. Live Scan won't accept fingerprints
unless they're perfect."
37
Many states chose to implement the system by using the FBI database to compare
the digital prints that are taken from suspects, but several other states also developed
their own databases using Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS")
computers. 38  These state systems are often created to work together with the FBI
system so that a state can access both the AFIS and IAFIS databases in order to reach
the largest number of possible prints to determine a successful "match." 39 The rewards
of the digitalization of fingerprints are obvious when viewed in this light. States with
the program have instant access to both the Federal criminal database and to a large
number of fellow participating state databases. Therefore, finding a criminal suspect
can now be done in a much smoother, timely, and cost efficient manner.
32. Id.
33. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1522.04 (1997) ("The Legislature supports the use of the
fingerprint live-scan technology, as identified in the long-range plan of the Department of Justice, for fully
automating the process of fingerprints and other data by the year 1999, otherwise known as the Califomia
Crime Information Intelligence System (CALCII) to be used for applicant fingerprints."). See also CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 29-12 (2004) ("The Commissioner of Public Safety may adopt regulations for the submission to
and the taking of fingerprints as required under this section which will promote efficiency and be consistent
with advances in automation and technology.").
34. NYPD Criminal Justice Bureau-New Initiatives available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
html/cjb/initiatives.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
35. Id.
36. Staff Reporter, Police Upgrade Fingerprinting Technology-Bellevue Police Start Using Live Scan,
KING COUNTY J., Dec. 31, 2000, available at http://www.kingcountyjournal.com/sited/story/html/39493 (last
visited Apr. 3, 2005).
37. Id.
38. See Jessica M. Sombat, Note, Latent Justice: Daubert's Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint
Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2819, 2832 (2002).
39. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14601 (West Supp. 2004). Notice (as previously stated, see supra text
accompanying note 19) this law specifies that these systems have to be "interoperable with systems operated
by States and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation" in order to receive the federal grants. Id.
[Vol. 31:2
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Time and money, however, are not the only benefits these systems afford. After
fingerprints are converted into digital format to be used in such systems, the
possibilities of technological advancements are endless. One such possibility is image
enhancement. Image enhancement is the process by which background patterns and
colors can be subtracted from a picture of a latent print.4 1 Latent fingerprints often refer
to the "small ... fingerprint fragments detected at crime scenes" from which fingerprint
identifications are made.42  These new technological advances dramatically change
crime scene investigation. For example, this technology enables an expert to use image
enhancement to "lift" a rapist's bloody print left on a bed sheet. The expert can view
such a print clearly when the weave from the sheet is lifted out of the picture by way of
image enhancement. Analysts also use image enhancement to remove other "patterns
from original latent fingerprints, including the background printing on a check, the dot
pattern on newsprint, and the weave pattern on material that would otherwise interfere
with identification. ' 43  This new technology made breakthroughs, not only in new
crimes, but also in old "cold cases" left unsolved until this new technology developed.
These digital fingerprinting systems also revolutionized the courtroom. Because of
the digital format, these prints are easily produced into juror-friendly trial exhibits. 4 4 At
a criminal trial, any "expert with the right software can convert the files from their
proprietary format into Adobe Acrobat TM files containing images that can easily be
inserted into PowerPoint TM and Microsoft Word TM documents." 45 This means that
instead of passing around sheet after sheet of black and white photocopies of the
evidence gathered, jurors can view evidence in color on a large screen in a slide-show
format. Not only is this technology useful for fingerprint comparisons, but experts can
also use it to demonstrate how certain prints were actually deposited.46 This format is
an extremely persuasive aide for an expert in his attempt to describe his findings to a
jury of lay people. Additionally, crime lab experts easily "produce the electronic data
that underlie their conclusions. ' 47 They can quite effortlessly duplicate the files from
the case by saving them onto any storage instrument.48 This allows the expert to not
only present the evidence clearly to the jury, but it also provides for easy replication of
data for discovery purposes.
4 9
40. See Michael Cherry, Reasons to Challenge Digital Evidence and Electronic Photography, 27
CHAMPION 42,42 (July 2003) (quoting CBS News, 60 Minutes II, The Hidden Clue) ("Detectives now have a
new tool for cracking even the toughest of cases," Jim Stewart reported. "Known as digital fingerprint
enhancement, it's become the silver bullet among police forensic units all across the country.") (citations
omitted).
41. Myth, supra note 4, at 36.
42. Epstein, supra note 5, at 607.
43. Myth, supra note 4, at 36.
44. See William C. Thompson et. al., Part 2: Evaluating Forensic DNA Evidence: Essential Elements of
a Competent Defense Review: Breaking Open the Black Box: How to Review the Electronic Data, 27
CHAMPION 24, 25 (May 2003) ("The electronic files are also useful for producing trial exhibits.").
45. Id.
46. See Kasey Wertheim, Adobe Photoshop for Demonstrating Latent Print Uniqueness, 53 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 707,720 (2003).
47. Thompson et. al., supra note 44, at 25.
48. See id.
49. See id. ("There is no legitimate excuse for refusing to turn over electronic data for defense review.").
2005]
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Although many states took advantage of the federal subsidy program for advancing
technology for criminal identification systems, others have yet to respond to the
demands of improving technology in the criminal field. The federal government has
exerted great efforts by offering generous monetary inducements through the Criminal
Identification Technology Act in order to encourage states to upgrade their criminal
databases. Therefore, while this new technology is expensive to implement, with
federal subsidies, and remarkable overall time saving and processing benefits, states
that have not adopted the systems are clearly imprudent. However, as states begin
utilizing these new systems, they quickly learn that this new technology does come with
problems, including cause for some constitutional concerns.
IV. NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW FINGERPRINTING TECHNOLOGY
A. Technical Problems Caused By a Lack of Standards
Although many of the benefits of new fingerprinting technology, such as image
enhancement, appear obvious, the flaws are not as easily observable. Michael Cherry
claims, "As a voting member of the evidentiary committee of The Association for
Information and Image Management (AIIM) and a pioneer in image management and
digital photography going back to the early NASA days, I know it's very difficult to
perform a proper enhancement, particularly a fingerprint enhancement." 51 For example,
Cherry points to the fact that "[e]ven unsophisticated image enhancements can render
some crime scene details and fingerprint minutiae unprintable.
52
The image itself is not the only cause for concern. It is important to also evaluate
the digital printer and camera that took the image because "[i]n many instances, the
digital printer used is not as accurate as the digital camera used, and therefore crime
scene details and fingerprint minutiae is lost." 53 Additionally, "[d]odge-and-burn, the
selective lighting and darkening of areas within an image, can place details outside of
the threshold of a digital printer's range of light and dark printing capabilities."
54
Unfortunately, even if Congress wanted to set some standard for the type of printer and
camera that is acceptable for generating evidence, they could not. This is simply
because such legislation cannot keep up with the rapidly evolving technology in this
area. Nevertheless, many agree that as this new technology is brought into the
courtroom, it is still important that the law is not lost amidst the wondrous technology.
55
Currently, there are no standards governing any courtroom technology and clearly some
are needed. Instead of regulating cameras, computers, and printers, which as already
50. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).





55. See, e.g., Jill Witkowski, Note, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational
Requirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 267 (2002).
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stated would be fruitless, guidelines should be created for the information produced
from these systems.
While Congress is updating some legislation such as the Criminal Identification
Technology Act, this selective process causes more issues to arise. Thus, as the federal
government and states implement the fingerprinting systems, the United States
Congress is failing to investigate and follow through with laws to govern information
stemming from these programs. Judges and lawyers of the courtroom need discernable
standards which can enable them to know what evidence is acceptable and what steps
should be followed to verify the evidence. As of yet, there are no uniform standards or
procedures.
B. New Techniques Raise Constitutional Concerns
Image enhancement is merely one result of digital fingerprinting. Another even
more questionable result is image creation.56 Most latent fingerprints found at a crime
scene are only partial prints. 57 Therefore, the job of the fingerprint expert is not to
compare two full fingerprints to discover a match, but instead to find a match to the
partial print. Yet in many cases, the partial print is not large enough to provide enough
points of comparison to find any match. But, with image creation, the police can take a
partial print found at a crime scene, and based on its detail and design, match it with
another partial print left at the scene (assumed to be from the same person) to create a
full print.58 Or, some systems are employed to provide a computer-generated view of
what the full print should be based upon the make-up of a partial print.59 This then
provides the police with a full fingerprint which can be run through a database for
suspect comparison. Although many would applaud technology that allows the
authorities to find a killer from twenty years ago, the constitutional issues of presenting
such evidence at a trial cannot be denied.6 1 Clearly, Fifth Amendment problems arise
in this area, since it would be almost impossible to argue that "due process" was
followed.
62
One important due process problem arises once digital media is used because the
possibilities of unreported manipulation are endless.63 This is a huge danger because
"[m]anipulation, as distinct from enhancement, consists of changing the elements of a
photograph or image by changing the colors, moving items from place to place on the
image, or otherwise altering the original image." 64  One program that makes image
manipulation available at the click of a mouse is Adobe Photoshop TM.65 This program
56. Myth, supra note 4, at 36.
57. Benedict, supra note 24, at 532.
58. Myth, supra note 4, at 36-37 (describing the process of one case which used image creation).
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 37.
61. See Witkowski, supra note 55, at 267 ("Digital imaging is one area in which the legal community
may be too hastily adopting new technology without fully considering the ramifications of its use.").
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. See Witkowski, supra note 55, at 271 ("Digital images are easier to manipulate than traditional
photographs and digital manipulation is more difficult to detect.").
64. Id.
65. See Wertheim, supra note 46, at 707.
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has an extensive choice of options which can be used for any image. 66 Although most
options do not apply to creating fingerprint exhibits, many fingerprint experts have
become wary of using this software.67 They realize that if such a program is employed,
their findings could easily be attacked for possible manipulation because of the
capabilities of Adobe Photoshop TM.68 This example illustrates the complexities that
arise when new technologically advanced programs are used for the production of
courtroom evidence. Although proponents of this technology argue that regular
photography can just as easily be doctored, "the potential for making subtle but
significant alterations to digital images gives cause for concern that digital images may
be unfit for use as evidence in a court of law."'69  Thus, when digital evidence is
presented in court, it should be held to a higher standard.70 That is not to say that this
technologically advanced evidence should be precluded from court, but it should
certainly be held up against tougher guidelines to ensure that the evidence is
constitutional.
7 1
Despite obvious constitutional concerns, courts are traditionally reluctant to hear
evidentiary objections to fingerprinting matches or to even enforce a higher standard for
admitting such evidence. 72 From the first introduction of fingerprints into courtrooms,
"judges expressed remarkably little skepticism about the authority of fingerprints,
accepting them as legal evidence with tremendous speed and little skepticism."
73
Additionally, "[p]rosecutors often argue that the use of fingerprint identification is
reliable because it has been accepted in the scientific community."'74 But this argument
is circular since it only states "it is verifiable because we use it."75 Even fingerprint
technicians find fault with this reasoning, noticing that "[t]here is no justification [for
fingerprint identification] based upon conventional science: no theoretical model,
statistics or an empirical validation process." 76  Therefore, as new fingerprint




69. Witkowski, supra note 55, at 272.
70. But see id. at 282 ("[M]any members of the law enforcement community have suggested that digital
images have not and should not be subject to stricter requirements than traditional photographs.").
71. See id. at 285 ("An authentication test ... tailored to digital imaging . . . would respond to
evidentiary concerns raised by digital imaging.").
72. Benedict, supra note 24, at 543 ("In their quest to maintain the admissibility of fingerprint evidence,
courts are extremely reluctant to apply equal scrutiny to fingerprint evidence.").
73. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 13, 22
(2001). See also Benedict, supra note 24, at 521 ("One judge described fingerprints as "the very archetype of
reliable expert testimony .... ""). See also Suspect Identities, supra note 23, at 47 (describing one view of the
courts' reasoning for the acceptance of fingerprinting). "The court[s] and other experts recognized that the
problem with fingerprinting is not the theory underlying it (fingerprint patterns are unique and unchanging)
but the application of the theory." Id.
74. Mears & Day, supra note 24, at 720.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 729 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering
Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1189, 1193 (2004) (describing how shortly after Daubert experts were surprised to learn that there was
no evidence to show the accuracy of "forensic fingerprint identification"). See also Benedict, supra note 24,
at 528 ("[T]he lynchpin of fingerprint identification-that no two are alike-has never been reliably
demonstrated.").
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just as they did with ink-based prints.77 Nevertheless, the behavior of the judiciary on
this matter finds support throughout the legal community, for even the advisory
committee which amends the Federal Rules of Evidence has yet to institute any changes
to deal with this technology.78 Therefore, many defense attorneys do not even object to
the admittance of advanced fingerprinting evidence as a result of the almost guaranteed
denial of such a motion. 79 Yet, new technology itself may also be a reason why defense
attorneys quiet their objections. As the legal community shifts towards creating
electronically-governed courtrooms, "[t]his trend may discourage lawyers and judges
from objecting to electronic images for fear that to do so would be counter-productive
to the movement towards convenience promised by increased computer use in
litigation."
' 80
But there is evidence that the entire legal field is not satisfied with this standard
since "a number of defense attorneys have already filed motions contesting the
admissibility of latent fingerprint identification evidence."'8 1 Their actions seem to be in
vain since, "[t]hus far, there is no reported decision granting such a motion."82  It
should be noted that these motions are not based upon any specifically tailored law,
because currently within the federal system there are no rules governing the
admissibility of this type of evidence. 83  Technically, "[i]n the courtroom enhanced
digital images are original images that have undergone some computer changes, and it
falls to the discretion of a trial judge as to whether they are admissible as duplicates."
84
This technical standard is insufficient. It is true that "[flingerprints can serve as an
identifying characteristic, and new technology such as digitally enhanced photographs
77. See Cole, supra note 76, at 1194 ("The main reason that fingerprint evidence lacks evidence of
reliability is that the courts-fingerprint examiners' primary arena for deploying their expertise-never
demanded such evidence from them.").
78. See Witkowski, supra note 55, at 284 ("Given that the Federal Rules of Evidence are constantly
being amended and that digital imaging has been gaining popularity for a number of years, it is clear that the
crafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence have chosen not to deal explicitly with digital imaging.").
79. See id. at 285 ("Digital images are rarely challenged in court.").
80. Id. at 287. But cf Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the Use and
Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 219, 220
(2002) (discussing how courts are more reluctant to introduce other advanced technology as evidence).
The use of digital technologies in performing tasks or making decisions that are vulnerable to legal
dispute presents significant challenges to the courts in understanding how the information was
derived, processed, and presented and in weighing the probative value of the information against
its potential to confuse. Despite the tremendous opportunity for technologies to enable more
informed, cost-effective decisions, issues of credibility, acceptability, and other evidentiary hurdles
are impeding the integration of these technologies into the routine operations performed by public
and private ... stewards.
Id.
81. Epstein, supra note 5, at 649.
82. Id. at 649-50.
83. See Witkowski, supra note 55, at 283 ("Federal Rule 901(b) does not provide significant guidance for
authentication of digital images .... Witness testimony limited to fair and accurate portrayal testimony omits
important information regarding the digital camera settings, including the compression ratio, storage medium,
and opportunity for manipulation.").
84. Cherry, supra note 40, at 42. See also FED. R. EVID. 1001 (4). Under this rule, it is established that:
A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or
electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduces the original.
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and expanded computer technology can assist in the development of fingerprint
comparison techniques." Nonetheless, "the process is presently incomplete and
imperfect and not worthy of admission in courts of law."
86
C. The Role of the Defense Attorney: A Call To Protect the Rights of the Accused
Some practitioners suggest that defense attorneys should not be discouraged by the
courts' obvious support of fingerprinting evidence. 87 In order to have a sustainable
objection to the fingerprint evidence, a good defense attorney should "no longer assume
that the image compared to your client's inked print was the original crime scene print.
That image may have been significantly altered or even manufactured by the police."
88
In order to ensure that constitutional safeguards are not trampled by technology, the first
step for defense attorneys is awareness. Thus, a criminal defense attorney should
"[d]emand to know whether the image compared to your client's . . . print was the
original impression found at the crime scene. If not, how did the police obtain--or
generate-the image that was compared?" 89 What, if any, software was used? 90 Were
proper guidelines followed? 9 1 If any answers are troubling, the defense attorney may
then make a motion in limine to exclude the fingerprint testimony of an expert.
92
Next, a defense attorney could make a Daubert challenge. A Daubert challenge
comes from the seminal case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.93 In this
case, the Supreme Court essentially found that "Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires
trial judges to act as gatekeepers, excluding expert opinions that lack sufficient
reliability."94 In fact, after Daubert, the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended in
2000 to reflect the changes made by this decision.95  As applied to fingerprinting
technology, however, this reliability standard poses problems because there are
"fundamental differences between fingerprint experts and other experts. ' 96  This
difference is present because, unlike other fields, the fingerprint community "has
developed exclusively for litigation and does not have a tradition of disinterested self-
testing.
97
85. Mears & Day, supra note 24, at 759.
86. Id.






93. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94. Epstein, supra note 5, at 617-18 (referencing 509 U.S. 579 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
95. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (The rule now calls for a three part test to determine if a witness qualified as
an expert may give testimony. The test to determine if an expert may testify is: "(1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.").
96. Recent Case: Evidence-Fingerprint Experts-Seventh Circuit Upholds the Reliability of Expert
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However, because of the innovativeness of this technology, there are few published
opinions dealing with a Daubert challenge for this new fingerprinting technology.
98
Additionally, many jurisdictions have yet to rule on the matter of image enhancement
and image creation. 99 But it is important for those seeking such a ruling, and indeed for
the judges who issue a ruling, to recognize that the standard is not whether image
enhancement or creation is valid as a theory. 10 0 Rather, the standard "is the accuracy of
the particular software which the police laboratory employed to enhance or create the
image in question. Under Daubert, the prosecution must establish 'appropriate
validation' for the soundness of that program."'
0'1
Daubert was further explained in the case of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael.10 2 In this case, the Supreme Court expanded the "gatekeeping" aspects of
Daubert to include all expert testimony, not merely expert testimony which was
"scientific." ' 103 Kumho would seem to make a Daubert challenge more likely, since
there could no longer be an argument that fingerprint experts were not "scientific"
because now all experts are subject to the "gatekeeping" determinations of the Court.
However, whatever help Kumho brings is only a mere plank in the bridge to gap the
commonly held view by most judges that fingerprinting technology should sustain a
Daubert challenge. 104  After Kumho, one federal district judge was brave enough to
restrict fingerprinting expert analysis in his courtroom. In United States v. Llera-
Plaza,105 Judge Pollak found that expert fingerprint testimony did not fulfill Daubert's
standards. 106 However, after much backlash within the law community, 107 and after
reviewing practices in England, the court reversed itself in United States v. Llera-Plaza
1,1°8 with Judge Pollak stating, "In short, I have changed my mind."
'109  With this
98. Myth, supra note 4, at 37. But see United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding
fingerprinting to sustain a Daubert challenge). "While the admissibility of handwriting evidence in the post-
Daubert world appears to be a matter of first impression for our Court, every circuit to have addressed the
issue has concluded, as on the fingerprint issue, that such evidence is properly admissible." Id. at 270. See
also United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (fingerprint identification satisfies Daubert).
99. Myth, supra note 4, at 37.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
103. Id. at 138 ("[I]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules
under which a "gatekeeping" obligation depended upon a distinction between "scientific" knowledge and
"technical" or "other specialized" knowledge, since there is no clear line dividing the one from the others and
no convincing need to make such distinctions.").
104. See Sombat, supra note 38, at 2822. ("[O]ne judge wrote after allowing the admission of fingerprint
evidence at trial, '[t]he court's decision may strike some as comparable to a breathless announcement that the
sky is blue and the sun rose in the east yesterday."') (quoting Hamilton, J., United States v. Havvard, 117
F.Supp. 2d 848, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff'd, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)).
105. No. CR 98-362-10, 2002 WL 27305, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002).
106. Id. at "18.
107. See D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21 QUINNIPIAC L.
REv. 1073,1073-74(2003)
The ruling sent shock waves through the community of fingerprint analysts, the FBI, and the
Department of Justice. The case became front page news. Fearing that "prosecutorial effectiveness
... would be seriously compromised," the government urged the court to reconsider its order that
the fingerprint analysis could not testify that the defendant was the source of the print in question.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Myth, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining how "the forensic science
community was stunned when Judge Pollak excluded fingerprint testimony").
108. 188 F.Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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reversal, the hopes of many that courts would review fingerprinting practices more
stringently were quickly dashed.
110
But all hope is not lost, for if a Daubert challenge proves to be fruitless, a defense
attorney can still make other objections at trial. For example, practitioners can employ
the "best evidence rule" to require that proponents offer the original crime scene
image at trial. 112 This should present a successful alternative, because, as one author
has pointed out, "[i]n the case of image enhancement, the computer has subtracted
pixels and changed the image. It is undeniable that the enhanced image differs from the
original. At the very least, the enhanced image is an incomplete version of the original
image." 13
However, if defense attorneys are successful in keeping image enhanced or image
created fingerprints out of the courtroom, then new problems arise for the prosecution,
who must convince a jury to convict despite the suppression of this evidence.
V. How NEW TECHNOLOGY AFFECTS THE MEDIA AND JURY EXPECTATIONS
If criminal court judges ban this new fingerprinting technology based upon
constitutional concerns, a successful Daubert challenge, 114 or the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the prosecution may be faced with a heavy burden in attempting to convince
jurors to issue a conviction. This is because "[d]eterminations of validity are not made
in a vacuum; our ideas of [the] plausible and our notions of the persuasive dramatically
affect how skeptically we view a new technique." 115 Because our ideas of plausibility
and our expectations are highly influenced by media enterprises such as television and
motion pictures, we can look to these genres to find the standards which many perceive
to be applicable in the courtroom. The problem with these standards is evident because
"TV has romanticized forensic science . . . [and] [a]ll this creates unrealistic
expectations in the minds of the public and juries."'
' 16
A. Jury Expectations in the New Millennium
It is no surprise to find that juries expect to have fingerprint evidence presented
during most criminal trials. 117 One attorney reports that, "his current practice is that in
109. Id. at 576.
110. See Recent Case, supra note 96, at 2355 ("[Fjor fields that do not have traditions of disinterested self-
testing, the trial judge's role as gatekeeper must be a more proactive one.").
111. See FED. R. EVID. 1002. This rule is often referred to as "the best evidence rule."
112. Myth, supra note 4, at 38.
113. Id.
114. Such an outcome is, however, highly unlikely.
115. Mnookin, supra note 73, at 69.
116. Cooley, supra note 1, at 477 (citations omitted). See also Carlene Hempel, TV's Whodunit Effect
Police Dramas Are Having an Unexpected Impact in the Real World. The Public Thinks Every Crime Can Be
Solved, and Solved Now-Just Like on Television, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003 (Magazine), at 13 ("It's just
that sometimes the shows do more harm than good.... [TV] educates the jury, and they grow to expect the
same from [real-life criminalists]. That's dangerous. Hollywood has to stretch it to keep you interested. In
real life [criminalists] can't.") (internal citations omitted).
117. See e.g., Benedict, supra note 24, at 520-21 ("In one survey of nearly 1000 jurors, 85% believed
fingerprints to be the most reliable method of identification."). Cf Hempel, supra note 116, at 13 ("[TV] has
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any case in which a juror might expect fingerprint evidence but fingerprint evidence is
lacking, he goes out of his way to put a fingerprint technician on the stand to explain the
lack of fingerprint evidence."' 118 The author notes that, "The expectation is so high and
widespread that any prosecutor risks an unjustified acquittal if he or she disregards that
expectation. If that expectation is disappointed, that disappointment may be the cause
of an acquittal.' ' 119 For example, in the recent case of Robert Blake, who was on trial
for the murder of his wife, Bonny Lee Bakley, jurors admitted that they were expecting
to see more convincing evidence. 12  Robert Blake was acquitted of murder, perhaps in
part because of the effect of shows like CSL 12 1  In fact, juror Cecilia Maldonado
acknowledged that she "expected so much more" and admitted that television shows
such as CSI produced "a higher expectation" for her.122 In effect, at least one juror's
disappointment with the evidence helped produced Blake's acquittal.
123
Several studies have discovered that juries are becoming more modem
themselves. 124 For example, by the year 2000, forty-one percent of the jury pool was
made up of Generation X-that is individuals born between the years 1966 and 1976.125
Recognizing that the jury will be made up of Generation X, trial lawyers must "adapt
both the substance and manner of their presentations to the contemporary juror.
126
This means that if an attorney is to have any chance of success, she must keep the
interest and attention of the jury. 12 7 It is important to realize that "Generation Xers
have experienced all of life and learning visually; thus, words without images are
unlikely to interest or persuade them."' 128 Juries not only expect to be given visuals, but
they expect many of them. "The days when the lawyer's oratorical skills alone could
sustain the interest of and convince a jury are past."' 129  Therefore, as technology
advances, so do juror expectations, for "[a]s forensic science makes advances in proving
contributed to jurors' desire to see more forensic testimony from the stand.").
118. Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique From the
Prospective of Juror Psychology, 100 MIL. L. REV. 99, 107 (1983) (citing the practice of E.J. Salinas, author
of National Association of District Attorney's Predicate Questions manual).
119. Id. But see Hempel, supra note 116, at 13 (describing how not all lawyers view it as a good effect).
"[lt has spurred a phenomenon that defense lawyers call "junk science," in which high-paid, underqualified
consultants are hired to lend a little razzle-dazzle to a case." Id. Also noting, "This is a breed of witness, no
doubt glorified by these TV shows, . . . who pitch themselves as forensic experts but lack the necessary
education and experience. Because of the demand, though, they've starting swarming courthouses like
cockroaches to an open refrigerator." Id. Also, "It wastes time and money,... with prosecutors starting to
demand sophisticated forensic tests that often have nothing to do with the case." Id.
120. Andrew Blankstein & Jean Guccione, The Blake Verdict and the 'CSI Effect,' CHI. TRIB., March 22,




124. See Gildin, supra note 7, at 61-62. See also Cooley, supra note 1, at 488 ("Neil Vidmar and Shari
Diamond have done research concerning juries and scientific evidence and they found, for the most part, that
'[c]laims about jury incompetence and irresponsibility in assessing and considering the testimony of scientific
experts [have] not [been] supported by research findings."') (quoting Neil Vidmar & Shari Diamond, Juries
and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1174 (2001)) (alteration in original).
125. See Gilden, supra note 7, at 61 (reporting that Generation X consists of 78.2 million Americans).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 65.




guilt and innocence, we have come to expect a forensic key that will solve every
crime." 130
Once fingerprinting technology takes place, it is easy to present this data in a new
and improved format to a jury.131 Jurors can now receive colorized and 3D fingerprint
evidence. Gone are the days of flat black and white ink photo-copied prints. Now,
fingerprint comparisons are presented to juries through live computer slide shows
available in "smart" courtrooms. 132 The similar markings which make one print match
another can be put into vibrant colors in order to conclusively illustrate the "match" to
the jury. These are ways in which technology can aid attorneys who struggle to
convince the Generation X members of their jury to find for their side.
B. Technology Infuses the Media and the Media Influences Jurors Perceptions
Jury expectations are important to consider, but what happens when expectations
are too high? 133  Current television productions incorporate new fingerprinting
technology into shows that viewers experience on a daily basis. The technology that is
depicted in these programs is often fictional and science does not frequently provide
clear cut answers because real life is not that simple.134 Yet with the success of a new
era of crime shows such as CSI,135 Cold Case,136 Without a Trace,137 and the endless
Law and Order13 8 shows, prospective jurors have come to expect the latest technology
to be presented to them in a trial.
139
130. Jessica Snyder Sachs, Book Review, Corpse: Nature, Forensics, and the Struggle to Pinpoint the
Time of Death, 50 FED. LAW. 46,46 (Aug. 2003).
131. See D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief and "Legitimate Moral
Force"--Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 403, 454-55 (1998)
("[T]echnology continues to increase our ability to bring ever more graphic and impactive representations into
the courtroom.").
132. These "smart" courtrooms, which are wired for computer technology, enable lawyers to present
evidence through computer projected screens via programs such as Microsoft PowerPoint TM.
133. See, e.g., Blankstein & Guccione, supra note 120. "There is no doubt that there's increasing
expectation by jurors of [the evidence] they're going to see." (quoting Joshua Marquis, an Oregon prosecutor
and member of the board of directors of the National District Attorneys Association) (alteration in original).
134. Sachs, supra note 130, at 46.
135. CS!: Crime Scene Investigation is a CBS hit show which has dominated the Nielson Ratings since its
premiere in October of 2000 and has spawned a hit spin-off-CS: Miami. See generally CS! on CBS,
available at http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi/main.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). See also Nielson
Television Ratings, available at http://www.nielsenmedia.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2005); Jon M. Sands &
Robyn Greenberg Varcoe, A Graphic Crime Scene: Daubert and the Evolving Standards for Forensic
Evidence, 27 CHAMPION 22, 23 (2003) (describing how the public is "keenly attuned to the subject" of
forensic evidence and how "hit shows such as CS! reflect this interest").
136. From the makers of CSI, this show looks at old unsolved cases and uses advances in technology to
reevaluate and eventually solve them. See generally Cold Case, available at http://www.cbs.com/primetime/
cold-case/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005).
137. This show, also produced by CBS, uses technology to find missing persons in record time. See
generally Without A Trace, available at http://www.cbs.com/primetimewithout_a_trace/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
138. The original Law and Order series is currently in its 14th season, and in recent years has produced
two successful spin-offs. See generally Law & Order, available at http://www.nbc.com/Law &_Order/about/
index.html/ (last visited on Apr. 3, 2005).
139. See Sachs, supra note 130, at 46 ("The public itself has a new awareness of forensic tools, provided
by the media and television programs such as 'CS1,' that feature the latest forensic wrinkle to solve the
'whodunit."'). See also Blankstein & Guccione, supra note 120 (quoting Barry Scheck, president of the
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Additionally, real life television is also to blame for the increased awareness of
forensic evidence. For example, "[flor three weeks in October 2002, America's
attention was captivated by the sniper shootings in and around the Virginia, Maryland,
and Washington, D.C. areas .... [But] [i]ronically, while firearm identification linked
the shootings, fingerprint evidence actually provided law enforcement their biggest
break."' 140 As the mayor of Montgomery described it, "[a]fter we submitted that
fingerprint, you saw this case break wide open ... [t]his print put a name with the
sniper."'14 1 A huge sector of the public viewed the crucial importance of fingerprint
identification just by watching television.
As a practical result of the television exposure of forensic evidence, some trial
attorneys take into account its effect on jury expectations. These attorneys work to feed
jurors' desire for forensic evidence. One commentator suggests, "If a jury's
expectations and interest can justify in-court displays which add no usably relevant
information, it would seem to suggest some right to dramatic presentation independent
of relevance." 1
42
It is difficult to convince a jury that what they see every day is not what happens in
real life. 143  Therefore, some of this technologically advanced evidence must be
presented if a prosecutor is to be successful. 144 If, however, the technology is banned• . 145
from a courtroom, a jury may not be as likely to issue a conviction. This, of course,
is helpful to defense attorneys, but is justice being done? Are juror expectations so high
as to surpass what constitutional limits will allow? If the latest technology is banned
because of due process concerns, is due process and the right to a fair trial truly being
preserved if juries refuse to convict a suspect without this evidence? Surely, if it is
looked at logically by even an average citizen, there are problems with a fingerprint
being produced electronically by a computer. Yet, if the average citizen is skipping this
step, and instead is demanding to be given the evidence portrayed in multi-media
enterprises, are we creating a standard with which the prosecution cannot possibly
cope? The federal government realizes that technology must be advanced in the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as noting that there is "an expectation that people from
the crime labs will have super technology to resolve a case") (internal quotation omitted).
140. Cooley, supra note 1, at 478-479. The print of John Malvo was lifted from gun and ammunition
magazine in Montgomery, Alabama. Id. at 479 (statement of Bobby Bright, mayor of Montgomery,
Alabama).
141. Id. (alterations in original).
142. Risinger, supra note 131, at 440.
143. See, e.g., Dick Clarke, Experts: CS! Fails Test of Time: Real Crimes Not Solved So Fast, They Say,
THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Apr. 19, 2002, at B5 (describing how even the new systems cannot
keep up with expectations). "With the new automated fingerprint system, we can do fingerprints within
hours-not within the minutes like they do [on TV]." Id. See also Scott D. Pierce, TV is Entertainment in
Spite of Reality Talk, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Feb. 9, 2003, at C04 (Reporting that one CSI technical
advisor stated, "We cheat time on our show.... It's not accurate, but it's a television show and we have to do
it.").
144. See Hempel, supra note 116, at 13 (describing one case where a chemist had to explain to a jury why
there was not forensic evidence). "Even in the face of eyewitness testimony, 'Juries are starting to say, "If all
that wasn't done in a case, maybe somebody else had done [the crime]"' Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
145. See id. ("They call it the "CSI effect," a phenomenon in which actual investigations are driven by the
expectations of the millions of people who watch fake whodunits on TV.").
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courtroom, as evidenced by passing the Criminal Identification Technology Act.
146
Many states are also aware of this emerging trend. But jurors must realize that allowing
technological advancements in criminal identification into the courtroom must not be
done at the price of our basic constitutional rights. The jury needs to recognize that the
people in the courtroom are real, with real rights, which often results in different
evidentiary rulings than they view on television. Often we criticize both the legislature
and the courts for adapting slowly to changing times. However, a slower pace of
change allows us to keep constitutional guarantees in check.
VI. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR CAREFULLY DRAWN STANDARDS
What is the answer for the prosecutor who is faced with a jury of Generation Xers
with preconceived notions of how a courtroom functions? Perhaps it is to approach the
problem head-on. Although juries do not like to be lectured, a quick reminder that the
world of the courtroom is not CSI or Law and Order, but rather one filled with real
laws, real rules, and real technology may be necessary. The jury needs to be reminded
that evidence must be evaluated based upon the standards of the courtroom, and not
based upon their own standards. Then, by all means, both the prosecutor and the
defense attorney should attempt to give the jury all the evidence, either computerized or
not, that is within their capacity to do so. Subsequently, it becomes the job of the judge
to make sure this evidence is constitutional before admitting it into the record.
Yet these lawyers and judges need to be guided by clear guidelines outlining the
admissibility of technology, and the evidence it generates, in the courtroom. Currently,
there are no standards present in federal court dealing with the admission of evidence
generated by the new advances in fingerprint technology. Although Congress made a
grand attempt to update the criminal system with the implementation of the Criminal
Identification Technology Act, these systems are only the beginning of a process. If
legislation is going to update one aspect of a process, then logic would call for an
update throughout the entire system. So far, Congress has yet to answer this call. The
implementation of the IAFIS and Live Scan systems have done wonders for identifying
criminal suspects. But if the current court standards do not allow this evidence to be
presented in a courtroom, then the time and money spent on these updates has been in
vain. It is true that most courts do not think twice about admitting into record
fingerprint evidence. And "[i]t is indisputable that fingerprints, when properly
employed, can play a vital role in the justice system, both to implicate guilty
11147defendants, and to exonerate innocent suspects. However, as more attorneys are
schooled in the capabilities of the new fingerprint technology and the cause for concern
for modifications, courts should be reluctant to allow some fingerprint imagery into
evidence. Currently, there is pressure on the criminal defense attorney who "must
ensure that fingerprint comparison evidence is used in a criminal prosecution only when
it is the result of scientifically reliable analysis by a true expert and not the conjuring of
a courtroom Merlin." 
148
146. 42 U.S.C. § 14601 (2000).
147. Benedict, supra note 24, at 522 (citation omitted).
148. Mears & Day, supra note 24, at 760.
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If defense attorneys can sway courts against the time honored tradition of admitting
fingerprint evidence, new problems arise. If courts do begin to refuse this evidence,
then judicial reluctance is placed in an obvious tension with jury expectations for the
latest advancement in forensic science. Above all else, the Constitution must be
consulted and upheld. Ultimately, the easiest and most effective way of solving these
internal criminal justice system conflicts is for Congress to either continue updating the
criminal court system and provide legislation on standards for such evidence, or to
request the advisory committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence to adopt some
standards for federal judges to follow when viewing evidence created out of the new
fingerprinting technology systems.
But what standards should Congress or the advisory committee adopt? The answer
is a difficult one to reach, suggesting that the task was purposely set aside because it is
too laborious. This new technology is amazing, and it is easy to imagine why a victim
would want to use new features such as image enhancement and even image creation in
order to find his assailant. But another view is seen by the suspect. How would the
suspect's family react upon learning that the evidence against their son was not left by
him, but actually generated by a machine? Where is the line drawn? If the line of
admitting evidence is too favorable to technology, then defense attorneys are sure to
object. However, if all technology is blocked, the prosecutor's job becomes impossible
for she will not be able to satisfy jury expectations. A standard that could be set is one
where computers can generate full prints from a partial latent print if there are enough
points on the partial to draw the conclusion of a match. Yet this begs the question: if
there are enough points for a match 149 on the partial, then why would you need the
computer to generate anything at all? Additionally, although many see computers as
flawless in their calculations, it must be remembered that all computer programs are
created by man-who is most definitely fallible.
The use of this technology in the courtroom should be governed by standards which
would require all fingerprints admitted to be verifiably unaltered. Therefore, use of
image enhancement, where a print would be lifted from its background, would be
admissible if an expert could prove that the print itself was not altered. Yet, this means
that until it can be proven that a computer can project a full print from a partial print
with one-hundred percent accuracy, then constitutional concerns, adopted into
standards, should prevent this technology from being presented in court. Therefore,
image enhancements, image enlargements to show minutiae of prints, colors to illustrate
details, and even 3-D perceptions should be allowable as long as no corruption took
place within the actual print. Of course, manipulation is possible, but as previously
stated, this is a concern for the present system as well. 150 Hopefully the standard of
verification would eliminate the possibility of corruption or print manipulation.
It should be noted that these are simply suggestions. Real standards and guidelines
need to come from either Congress, the advisory committee for the Federal Rules of
149. Another debate separate unto itself is that the fingerprint community has no current standards to
determine how many points of matching minutiae equal a positive identification. See, e.g., Epstein, supra
note 5, at 610 ("[T]here is considerable disagreement among fingerprint examiners as to how many common
ridge characteristics should be found before an identification is made.").
150. See Witkowski, supra note 55, at 272 ("[S]ome proponents of digital images argue that it is just as
easy to manipulate a photograph as it is to manipulate a digital image.").
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Evidence, or some other law making body. The top legal officials and scholars need to
take notice of advancing technology and develop standards in order for the field of law
to adapt and grow, while at the same time preserving the rights of all Americans
guaranteed in the United States Constitution. Until Congress focuses its attention on
this important area, then, like our own fingerprints, these rights will continue to be in
jeopardy of manipulation.
